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DID TRIPS SPUR INNOVATION? AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT
DURATION AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE

DAVID S. ABRAMS

†

How to structure IP laws in order to maximize social welfare by striking the
right balance between incentives to innovate and access to innovation is an
empirical question. It is a challenging one to answer, both because innovation
is difficult to value and because changes in IP protection are rare. The 1995
TRIPS agreement provides a unique opportunity to explore this question for two
reasons. First, the implementation of the agreement was uncertain until shortly
before adoption, making it a plausibly exogenous change in patent duration.
Second, the nature of the law change meant that the patent-duration change
was heterogeneous across patent classes. Using both patent counts and citationweighted counts, I am able to exploit the TRIPS-induced law change to empirically evaluate the impact of patent duration on innovation. I find evidence for
an increase in innovation due to patent-term extension following TRIPS. Both
patent counts and citation-weighted counts increased more after TRIPS in those
classes that received greater expected term extensions relative to classes receiving
shorter extensions. While the precise calibration of innovation valuation is difficult, this Article provides the first attempt to empirically evaluate its response to a
major change in patent duration from the TRIPS agreement.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, as part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) that created the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United
1
States made the largest change in patent terms in over forty years. In
order to conform to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel2
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the United States changed the duration of patent protection from seventeen years from grant date to twenty
3
years from application date. This change affords the opportunity to
learn about one of the most basic issues in IP: the relationship between
the quantity of innovation and the duration of IP protection.
In this Article, I explore this relationship between duration and
quantity using U.S. patent application and citation data around the
dates of the implementation of the TRIPS agreement. I use a difference-in-difference framework—exploiting the heterogeneous impact
of the change across patent classes—based on Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) processing time. I find a statistically significant relationship between the magnitude of the term extension resulting from the
TRIPS law change and patent count. Further, I find that this relationship persists when using citation-weighted patent counts as the dependent variable, which is arguably a better proxy for value of innova1

The most significant change prior to 1994 was Congress’s enactment of 35 U.S.C.
§ 154 in 1952. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
2
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS].
3
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532(a), 108 Stat. 4809,
4984-85 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 17, 19, and 35 U.S.C.).
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tion. I do not find a significant increase in the average number of citations to patents receiving longer extensions relative to those receiving shorter extensions following the change.
Standard theory argues that an increase in the duration of patent
protection has two primary effects: an increased incentive to innovate
(created by monopoly profits) and increased deadweight loss (due to
4
exclusive rights). The optimal patent term is that point at which the
marginal benefit from increased innovation is exactly offset by the
marginal cost of the deadweight loss created by the patent right.
Determining the optimal patent term is extremely important from
a policy perspective. If patent protection lasts too long, the monopolylike deadweight loss, caused by the patent’s conferral of exclusive
rights, outweighs the additional innovation such rights will spur. On
the other hand, a patent term that is too short will yield underproduction of innovation, leading to a decrease in productivity and growth.
In order to find the optimum empirically, it is necessary to estimate
the elasticity of production of innovation with respect to the duration
of protection. Previously, the ability to empirically evaluate the optimal patent length was limited by a dearth of data, a lack of computing
power, and an absence of a change to patent length with which to
5
evaluate the elasticity.
This Article works towards evaluating the elasticity of production
of innovation by examining data from 1990 through 2000 in light of
the 1995 change in patent protection. The change in duration provides the denominator for the elasticity calculation (which I calculate
separately by patent class). Though the change was not completely
unanticipated, it was part of a global-trade accord that encompassed
myriad issues beyond intellectual property. Thus, the law change may
be viewed as plausibly exogenous (this assumption will be examined
more closely later in the Article) and allows for the identification of
the impact of a modification in patent duration.
4

See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76 (1969) (noting that a longer patent life “increases invention” but also increases “losses from inefficiencies associated with monopoly”).
5
Elasticity is a mathematical term often used in economics that is similar to the
derivative in calculus. But whereas the derivative measures the absolute change in the
dependent variable with respect to the independent variable, the elasticity is defined as
the percentage change in the dependent variable with respect to the percentage
change in the independent variable.
In this Article, I am interested in the elasticity of production of innovation with
respect to patent duration. The elasticity I wish to estimate is percent change in innovation divided by percent change in patent duration.
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The numerator in the elasticity calculation should ideally be the
percentage change in the total social welfare derived from patented
ideas—an exceedingly difficult quantity to measure. In this Article, I
6
take two approaches to approximating this quantity. The first approximation makes use of simple patent counts as a proxy for the
value of innovation, examining the number of patents obtained prior
to and after the 1995 law change by patent class. While this method
should yield the correct sign for the elasticity, the magnitude could be
substantially off unless the value of the marginal patentable innovation is constant, which seems highly unlikely. Nevertheless, using patent counts as a measure of innovation has a long history and is infor7
mative about the response of innovators to incentives.
8
Previous research has shown that patents vary widely in value. A
closer approximation of total patent value may be obtained by weighting patents according to how many citations they receive from subse9
quent patents. This method accounts for some of the heterogeneity in
6

There is also a third approach—based on patent-renewal data—which I describe
infra note 10. However, a full analysis under this approach is beyond the scope of this
Article.
7
See, e.g., Rebecca Henderson, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Universities as
a Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965–1988,
80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119, 119-22 (1998) (exploring the use of university patents as an
indicator of innovation). See generally Zvi Griliches, Introduction to R & D, PATENTS, AND
PRODUCTIVITY 1, 14 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984) (reflecting on the general theme of the
conference, that “patent counts are, after all, one of the few direct quantitative glimpses into
the innovation process available to us”).
8
See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, How To Count Patents
and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405, 411-18 (1998) (recognizing variance in patent value across time, industries, nationalities, and technology categories); Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some
Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755, 767-80
(1986) (analyzing the returns on European patent stocks and finding that patent value
varies by country); Ariel Pakes & Margaret Simpson, Patent Renewal Data, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 331, 355-64 (noting that “patents
vary greatly in both their private and social values” while considering how patentrenewal data can be used to analyze patent value).
9
See Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent
Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16, 19 (2005) (describing how the valuable economic and
technological information provided by patent citations may help gauge the “‘value’ of
patents”); Dietmar Harhoff et al., Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions,
81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 511, 515 (1999) (finding that “patents reported to be relatively
valuable by the companies holding them are more heavily cited in subsequent patents”); Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg & Rebecca Henderson, Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577, 583 (1993)
(discussing how patent citations carry more weight than academic citations); Adam B.
Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg & Michael S. Fogarty, Knowledge Spillovers and Patent Citations:
Evidence from a Survey of Inventors, 90 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 215, 217 (2000)
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patent values and allows for weaker assumptions about the value of the
10
marginal patentable innovation. I make use of the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) patent database, which contains patent ci11
tations, in order to obtain a better estimate of the numerator.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the
background of the TRIPS agreement and the subsequent law change,
related literature, and theoretical framework used to analyze its impact. The data are found in Part II and the econometric methodology
(noting how authors increasingly utilize “the total number of citations received by a
patent as an indicator of the relative significance of patents”); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark
Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J. 441, 446-47 (2004) (developing a composite index of patent
quality using multiple factors, including backward and forward citations); Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations, 21 RAND
J. ECON. 172, 173-75 (1990) (suggesting that patent citations should be used as an index of the value of patents); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, The Quality of
Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators 1-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working
Paper
No.
7345,
1999),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/
papers/w7345 (using backward and forward citations as indicators of patent quality).
10
In other work, I take a third approach to estimating the change in production
of innovation in response to the implementation of TRIPS: using actual renewal decisions by patent holders to estimate the distribution of the private value of patents. In
most countries, patent holders must pay a maintenance fee to keep their patents in
force. This fee implicitly forces patent holders to make a calculation regarding the future expected returns from the patent.
Various scholars have used this patent-renewal approach in analyzing data from
European countries. E.g., Jean Olson Lanjouw, Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 671 (1998) (West
Germany); Pakes & Simpson, supra note 8 (Norway and Finland); Mark Schankerman
& Ariel Pakes, Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post1950 Period, 96 ECON. J. 1052 (1986) (United Kingdom, France, and Germany); Mark
Schankerman, How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J.
ECON. 77 (1998) (France).
The Patents as Options methodology has rarely been used on U.S. data in the academic literature for three primary reasons. First, the United States only began charging maintenance fees for options in 1982. Because this research originated shortly
thereafter, there was not enough data available at the time to perform the estimation.
Second, U.S. maintenance fees tend to be somewhat lower than those in Europe, which
makes estimating the upper tail of the distribution more dependent on functional-form
assumptions. Last, maintenance fees are only required to be paid three times in the
United States (as opposed to annually in Europe), making the estimates on U.S. data less
precise. There has, however, been one previous publication making use of patent-renewal
data in the United States. See Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using
Statistical Survival Analysis To Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317 (2002) (examining a particular sample of patents granted at a particular point in time).
My analysis (forthcoming) will be one of the first applications of the Patents as Options approach to U.S. data, and it will allow for the most sophisticated evaluation of
the law change resulting from the TRIPS agreement.
11
For a description of the data used in this Article, see infra Part II.
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is explained in Part III. Part IV contains the main results from both
the patent-count and citation approaches. Part V discusses the results
and their limitations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS agreement grew out of the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations, which lasted from 1986 through 1994 and led to the
12
creation of the WTO. TRIPS covered many aspects of intellectual
property and required harmonization of IP laws among the developed
signatory countries. Within the realm of patents, the key requirements
of TRIPS were that patents be made available without discrimination to
13
citizens of TRIPS signatory nations on both products and processes
14
and that the protection extend for a minimum of twenty years.
At the time of TRIPS’s passage, U.S. patent law provided for seventeen years of patent protection, as measured from the patent grant
date. Thus, TRIPS necessitated a significant modification of U.S. law.
The seventeen years of patent protection in the United States was not
derived from an economic calculation, as advocated in this Article.
Initially, U.S. law was modeled on English law, which set an initial
fourteen-year patent term based on the expected training period for
15
two sets of apprentices. Nordhaus points out that “[a]fter some further compromise it was decided for the United States that 2.43 ap16
prentices, or 17 years, would be the proper length.”
For the purposes of this analysis, there are three relevant dates to
consider that could have potentially affected innovative activity, as displayed below in Figure 1. The first is the date that the final package
17
negotiated through the Uruguay Round was signed, April 15, 1994.
The second is the date the U.S. Congress ratified the package, De-

12

TRIPS, supra note 2.
Id. art. 27.
14
Id. art. 33.
15
See NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 82 n.18 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 9 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz
Machlup)), which explains the basis for U.S. patent terms.
16
Id.
17
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/03-fa.pdf.
13
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18

cember 8, 1994. The third is the date that the change became effec19
tive in the United States, June 8, 1995. Based on news reports at the
time, it is clear that while the April 15, 1994, signing of the agreement
was symbolically important, it was far from certain that the agreement
20
would be effectuated. It was not until ratification by Congress that
TRIPS was expected to be implemented.
Figure 1: Key Dates for the Uruguay Round of GATT
1/1/94

4/15/94

12/8/94

6/8/95

Negotiations
Concluded

Accord Ratified
by U.S. Congress

TRIPS PatentTerm Changes
Become Effective

12/31/95

Difference in difference is an economic technique that may be
used to isolate the effect of a law change such as that brought on by
the TRIPS agreement. One major application of the technique is to
avoid ascribing a causal effect to a law change that is really due to a
contemporaneous change or a time trend. This is a significant problem with the single difference, or before-after analysis. With the difference-in-difference approach, one takes the before-after difference
for a group that should be affected by the law change and takes a second difference with the before-after difference of a group that should

18

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 17, 19, and 35 U.S.C.).
19
See id. § 534 (mandating that “the amendments made by section 532 take effect
on the date that is 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act”).
20
See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Foes Line Up To Do Battle over GATT, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1994, at D1 (elaborating on the battle over GATT); Helene Cooper & John Harwood,
World Trade Pact Limps Toward a Showdown, Bruised by Talk Radio, Sovereignty Issue, Politics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1994, at A16 (listing a variety of roadblocks in GATT’s path);
Bob Davis & Lawrence Ingrassia, Trade Acceptance: After Years of Talks, GATT Is at Last
Ready To Sign Off on a Pact, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1993, at A1 (recognizing that congressional ratification of GATT still faced opposition from American industry); Bob Davis,
Unexpected Obstacles Are Threatening To Delay or Derail Congressional Approval of GATT Pact,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1994, at A16 (detailing the problems in getting congressional approval for GATT); Thomas L. Friedman, Dole Explains Trade Treaty Stand, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 1994, at D2 (explaining the Senate Minority Leader’s opposition to parts of
GATT); David Sanger, After Years of Talk, Trade Pact Now Awaits Congressional Fate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, at A1 (detailing the remaining questions regarding GATT).
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be unaffected (or less affected). This is akin to creating an experimental and a control group.
For example, consider a law that becomes effective in January
2010 that reduces the cost of bankruptcy but that is phased out for individuals earning above $100,000. A comparison of bankruptcy rates
between 2009 and 2010 shows an overall increase of ten percent, but
the concern is that this may be due to factors other than the law. Now
consider the difference-in-difference approach, comparing the beforeafter change in bankruptcy rates between those making over $100,000
with those making less. One finds that bankruptcy rates increased by
eleven percent for those earning over $100,000 and increased nine
percent for those earning under $100,000. The difference in difference is 9% - 11% = -2%. Thus it seems likely that the law did not increase bankruptcy rates at all, as in fact bankruptcy rates slightly decreased for individuals impacted by the law, relative to those unaffected.
For the difference-in-difference approach used in this Article, it is
important to understand the exact nature and timing of the changes
in expectations of prospective innovators and how one might expect
those to be reflected in patenting decisions. Prospective filers of patents could respond to the knowledge of the law change (December 8,
1994), to the change itself, or to both. There are two subsections of
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) that are relevant to this inquiry. The first is the
subsection specifying the patent term in the transition period:
The term of a patent that is in force on or that results from an application filed before the date that is 6 months after the date of the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act shall be the greater of the
20-year term as provided in subsection (a), or 17 years from grant, sub21
ject to any terminal disclaimers.

The second is the subsection specifying the patent term after the
change:
Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a term
beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from
the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United
States or, if the application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed
application or applications under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title,
22
from the date on which the earliest such application was filed.

21
22

Id. § 154(c)(1).
Id. § 154(a)(2).
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Thus, the change to the patent term had two dimensions. The
first was a change in length from seventeen to twenty years. The second was a change in how the length of protection was measured—
from grant date to application date, as illustrated by Figure 2. This
had the important effect of varying the change in expected patent duration depending on the processing time between application and grant date.
This is the variation that makes the difference-in-difference approach
used in this Article possible. While patent protection increased on average, it only did so for those patent applications that required less
than three years processing time. Patent applications that took longer
than three years between application and grant date ended up with a
shorter term of protection under the new law than previously.
Figure 2: Impact of TRIPS on Patent Duration
Pre-1995 Rule

17 Years
Post-1995 Rule

20 Years
Processing Time

Application Date

Grant Date

Expiration

The Uruguay Round Agreements Act was enacted on December 8,
23
1994, making June 8, 1995, the date that the patent term changed.
Note that the wording of the law implicitly grants an option to those
who filed their application before June 8, 1995, to receive the longer
of seventeen years from grant date and twenty years from application
24
date. Thus, individuals who expected to have a decrease in patent

23
24

See supra notes 18-19.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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duration should have applied ahead of the June 8, 1995, change.
Those who expected to have an increase in duration did not need to
wait until after the change because they could opt into the new rule
even before June 8, 1995. This should lead to a spike in applications
prior to the rule change that is most pronounced among patent
classes with the lowest expected extension. This prediction is borne
out by the data, as can be seen in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Monthly U.S. Patent Counts, 1994–1997

0

5000

Count
10,000

15,000

20,000

Bottom and Top 25% by Extension Time

10

-5
0
5
Months Relative to June 8, 1995
Shortest Patent Extension

10

Longest Patent Extension

B. Related Literature
The framework for much economic analysis of patents is laid out
by William Nordhaus in his 1969 work, Innovation, Growth, and Wel25
fare. In this framework (described further in Part II), policymakers
set patent terms to equalize the welfare gains from innovation due to
longer patents with the welfare losses due to the grant of exclusivity.
The estimation performed in this Article may be used to inform the
25

NORDHAUS, supra note 4.
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policymakers from Nordhaus’s setup. Half of the calculation is provided here; the deadweight-loss calculation is left for future research.
While the Nordhaus framework is the dominant approach, there
are a number of papers that suggest alternative perspectives on the
function of patents. In Nordhaus’s model, time of patent expiration is
26
a monotonically increasing function of patent duration. This is a
consequence of the fact that, in the model, innovation cannot be sped
up in response to changes to patent duration. John Duffy proposes a
model that allows for varying innovation times that can be impacted
27
by patent duration. He shows that the relationship between time of
patent expiration and patent duration will then have a U-shape, and
thus, that the monopoly/innovation tradeoff need not exist if the pat28
ent duration is chosen optimally. While this Article will not distinguish between Duffy’s approach and that of Nordhaus, it is worth noting that Duffy’s perspective leads to a different interpretation of the
estimates found here.
In Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, Steven Shavell and
Tanguy Van Ypersele argue that an ideal rewards system would be superior to any kind of patent system because it would not suffer from
29
the deadweight loss of monopoly. They acknowledge that the practical difficulty with such a system is that the government must deter30
mine the correct award sizes. Instead, they propose that an optional
rewards system layered onto a patent system would be superior to a
31
simple patent system in encouraging innovation. The difficulty of
setting proper incentives for innovation, either through rewards or
subsidies to researchers, is discussed by John Duffy and Louis Kaplow
32
in separate papers. Kaplow states as the main argument for the patent system over a rewards system that it is thought to be too difficult to
determine the appropriate level of reward fairly and accurately on a

26

Id. at 71.
John F. Duffy, A Minimum Optimal Patent Term 2-3 ( Jan. 9, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=354282 (presenting graphs showing that “an increase in patent terms does not necessarily involve this tradeoff”).
28
Id.
29
Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights,
44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 530 (2001).
30
Id. at 541-42.
31
Id. at 537-41.
32
John. F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 37 (2004); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1813 (1984).
27
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33

“case-by-case basis.” Michael Abramowicz suggests a way to make a
system of prizes more practical by obfuscating the determination of
reward and thereby reducing the inefficient rent-seeking behavior that
34
prizes can cause.
Several recent papers suggest possible shortcomings of the basic
economic model of patents. Alexander Tabarrok points out that although modern patent systems are premised on the notion of paying
back innovators’ high fixed costs though grants of monopoly, in real35
ity the law ignores fixed costs. He proposes modifications to patent
36
law to address this disconnect. Nancy Gallini reviews the literature
on the issue of the relationship between strength of patents and quan37
tity of innovation. She discusses recent theories that differ from the
Nordhaus model by accounting for follow-on inventions, and she does
not predict an unambiguously positive relationship between patent
duration and innovation. She notes that “[e]xtending patent life may
increase an entrant’s incentives to introduce an imitation during the
patent period,” with the result being that “incentives to innovate may
38
decline with increases in patent life.” Gideon Parchomovsky and R.
Polk Wagner suggest another shortcoming of the standard model in
the modern environment: its failure to account for portfolios of pat39
ents. They argue that the relationship between value and number of
patents is nonlinear among holders of patent portfolios, and thus even
40
negative-expected-value patents could be pursued by such entities.
In this environment, it is unclear what impact increased duration of
protection would have.
Empirical research on the incentive effects of patent duration is
quite difficult due to the scarcity of policy variation. Josh Lerner has
assembled a large cross-country dataset covering 150 years of IP

33

Kaplow, supra note 32, at 1844.
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 218-24 (2003).
35
Alexander Tabarrok, Patent Theory Versus Patent Law, CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL’Y, 2002, at 1-2, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1039&context=bejeap.
36
Id. at 8-11.
37
Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform,
16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2002).
38
Id. at 136.
39
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005).
40
Id. at 28-29.
34
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41

changes. Although he finds little impact of strength of patent protection, the study suffers from the standard difficulties of cross-country
comparisons and endogeneity. He attempts to confront the endogeneity concern by instrumenting for patent law changes with international agreements (including TRIPS) and still finds no significant im42
pact on the number of patents filed.
Petra Moser also uses historical data in one of the most creative
recent papers on innovation, in which she studies nineteenth century
43
World’s Fairs. By collecting data on the exhibits at the World’s Fairs
and nineteenth Century IP laws, she attempts to determine the impact
that the laws have on field and magnitude of innovation. She finds
significant cross-country differences in the distribution of innovation
by technological field that grow stronger with increased patent dura44
tion. She also finds some evidence that there is a diminishing mar45
ginal incentive effect of patent duration.
46
Empirical work on patent duration is relatively scant, and work
focusing on the impact of TRIPS in the United States is almost non47
existent save for an early piece by Mark Lemley. In that piece, he
collects data from a single issue of the PTO’s Official Gazette shortly after passage of the TRIPS legislation (but before its implementation) in
order to evaluate the likely impact of the law change on patent duration. He finds that the mean patent duration should increase, although not uniformly across classes (a finding that is subsequently
48
borne out in the data). He further predicts that processing time
should decrease due to increased incentives for patent attorneys to re-

41

Josh Lerner, Patent Protection and Innovation over 150 Years (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8977, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w8977.
42
Id. at 26-28.
43
Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from NineteenthCentury World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (2005).
44
Id. at 1216.
45
Id. at 1224.
46
Adam Jaffe also examines recent developments in the U.S. patent system and
surveys both the theoretical and empirical literature. While he touches on patent
scope, he does not discuss any recent work on patent duration or the impact of the
TRIPS agreement, perhaps because there has been relatively little. Adam B. Jaffe, The
U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy, Innovation, and the Innovation Process, 29 RES.
POL’Y 531 (2000).
47
Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J.
369 (1994).
48
See id. at 392-93.
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49

spond to office actions more quickly. This prediction does not appear to be borne out by the data, perhaps due to an offsetting increase
in PTO processing times. Nevertheless, the paper is an important
early contribution to the understanding of the impact of TRIPS in the
United States.
C. Theoretical Background
So far the discussion has focused on the number of innovations,
50
but we now turn to the magnitude. Following Nordhaus, one may
write down a simple model of the profit-maximizing inventor. Under
some rough assumptions, we find that magnitude of innovation
should increase with increasing duration of patent protection. The
exact timing of the response depends on the lag in time between research inputs and patentable outputs. If the lag is less than six
months, then we should expect to see an increase in value of patent
applications beginning on June 8, 1995. If the lag is longer, we should
expect to see the increased value of patents occurring later. This leads
to a testable prediction (although one not examined in this Article):
those industries with longer lags should see an increase in citationweighted patents later than those in industries with shorter lags. But
the key testable implication is straightforward: there should be an increase in the level of innovation—by whatever measure—following the
implementation of TRIPS due to the overall term extension.
Another important approach to evaluating the shift in innovation
around the TRIPS law change is by making use of citation data. Previously, the analysis has made use of patent counts alone, which may be
a good proxy for aggregate innovation under certain assumptions.
For example, if we assume that there is no correlation between innovation quantity and marginal patent value, then patent counts are an
adequate proxy for aggregate value. However, it is easy to imagine instances in which this would not be the case, such as when a firm can
either produce two patentable goods worth one util each or one patentable good worth two utils. In this case, marginal patent value is inversely correlated with quantity of innovation, and aggregate value is
uncorrelated with patent count.

49

See id. at 415-16.
See NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 70-75 (establishing a framework for the economics of patents).
50
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One indicator that should correlate with a patent’s value is how
frequently it is cited by subsequent patents. Presumably, patents with
greater value, whether private or social, will have a greater impact on
future inventors, and this should be reflected in their citations. There
is literature on the relationship between patent citations and value
51
that goes back at least to Manuel Trajtenberg’s 1990 RAND paper.
In the paper, he relies on his previous research, in which he uses a
structural approach to estimate the demand system for attributes of
52
Computed Tomography (CT) scanners. The estimated parameters
of the demand system are used to calculate a social value for innovation in CT-scanner technology. He tests the correlation between these
values and simple patent counts as well as citation-weighted patent
counts, and he finds a substantially stronger correlation with the lat53
ter. He further finds that the correlation increases when the citation
index used is slightly convex, indicating an increasing return to cita54
tions. The empirical analysis in this Article focuses on both patent
counts and citation-weighted counts.
II. DATA
All data originally come from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, but was obtained for this research from two sources. Polk Wagner kindly made available data on all U.S. patents granted between
1976 and fall 2008, with information including patent class, processing
time, and application date. Through the NBER-patent citation database, I obtained data on all U.S. patents granted between 1963 and
2002, along with citations made to those patents between 1975 and
55
2002. These data include such fields as patent category, number of

51

Trajtenberg, supra note 9. For further literature, see other sources cited supra

note 9.
52

See id. at 177-78 (discussing demand for CT scanners as analyzed in Manuel Trajtenberg, The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations, with an Application to Computed Tomography Scanners, 97 J. POL. ECON. 444 (1989)).
53
See id. at 180-81.
54
n
That is, when using a weighting factor of the form c , Trajtenberg finds a higher
correlation between the citation index and the measure of patent value when n > 1. Id.
at 182.
55
To view this data file in detail, see The NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File,
http://www.nber.org/patents (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). For the source of this database, as well as a description of its enormity and an analysis of its implications, see
Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citations Data
File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8498, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.
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claims, number of citations, and information on the assignee, inventor, and year (but not date) of application. Because I am interested in
a change occurring in 1995, I chose various windows around that year
for the analysis, the largest of which ranges ten years around June 8,
56
1995, as depicted in Figure 4. Summary statistics of the data can be
found in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix.
Figure 4: Windows for Patent Count/Citation Analysis
June 8, 1995

Inner Window

Outer Window

The data summarized and used in the regressions include over
one million patent applications that were submitted between 1990 and
2000 and subsequently granted. I excluded patent classes that did not
receive at least thirty subsequently granted applications in each year
between 1990 and 2000 to ensure that the calculations are not overly
influenced by outliers. Imposing this restriction excludes approximately 200,000 observations. The vast majority of these observations
are actually in patent classes that are either established or abolished in
the decade of interest, which results in zero observations for some
years. These naturally tend to be classes relating to new or obsolete

56

This Article only reports data for outer windows up to two years, but the results
from larger windows are available from the author.
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57

technology, and patenting behavior in these classes may be very different from behavior with regard to established technology. In particular, it is likely that many other factors beyond duration of patent
protection have substantial influence in these fields; thus, excluding
them allows for a more focused examination of the phenomenon in question. There may also be a truncation-bias concern: namely, that patents
with long processing times would be represented at a lower rate because
the data were obtained in fall 2008. However, as Figure 5 indicates, a very
small fraction of patents have processing times as long as eight years, so this
should not have a significant impact on the results.
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Figure 5: Processing Time Two Years Prior to Law Change

0

500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Number of Days Between Application Date and Issue Date

One can see in Table 1 that the number of claims per patent application increases over the 1990s, with the median patent application having
58
one extra claim in the latter half of the decade. “Forward citations” refers to the number of times that a patent was cited by subsequent applications. I have data on citations contained in applications submitted
57

See infra app. tbl.3.
Note that there are approximately one-third the number of observations for claims
for the five years following the law change as there were before. This is an artifact of the
NBER data set, which is missing claims data for most of the later observations.
58
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through December 31, 2002. This measure will monotonically increase
with time, and thus it is not surprising to note that the mean number of
forward cites decreases from 6.4 to 1.8 from the period before the law
change to the period afterwards. The earlier group had an average of ten
years to collect citations, versus five years for the later group.
In order to compare the value of patents, something must be done
to normalize the citations data. The approach I take in this Article is a
fixed-effects approach, predicated on the assumption that the expected present value of all patents in a month is time invariant. Thus,
the mean patent issued in July 1999 should have the same value as that
issued in February 1991. This should be reflected by their having the
same number of citations, if the number of citations were computed n
years after the respective grant dates for each mean patent. Of course,
at any point in time, the mean 1991 patent will have more citations to
it than the mean 1999 patent simply because it has had more time to
accumulate them. In the data, the citation counts are based on the
total number of citations each patent had received as of December 31,
2002. Using the fixed-effects approach, I normalize the citation
counts by dividing the actual number of patents by the mean number
of citations received by all patents in that month. The advantage of
this approach is that it allows for a nonparametric functional form for
the citation-generating process. One disadvantage is that the renormalized distribution of patents will not necessarily have the same shape for all
subsets, largely due to the fact that patents with zero citations will still
have zero after renormalization.
A comparison of the summary statistics for the new measure of forward citations in panels A and B of Table 1 bears this out. By construction, the mean number of normalized forward citations is the same for
both periods, but the median is substantially lower after the law change.
This is a direct consequence of the aforementioned problem with zeroes.
The key independent variable in this analysis is the expected
59
length of term extension for a prospective innovator. It is important
that there is enough dispersion in this variable that there is meaningful variation with which one may hope to identify an impact. Panel A
of Table 1 indicates that the standard deviation of the term extension
is approximately one year, so this study will mostly be limited to identifying the impact of relatively small percentage changes in patent duration (around five to ten percent). This is a potential concern of the
study design and is discussed further in Part V. Figure 6 shows the full
59

Its construction is described in detail infra Part III.
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left-skewed distribution of the term extension by patent class. Almost
all patent classes receive an increase in expected duration due to
TRIPS. Even though there are few classes that receive actual reductions in expected duration, the variation in the regression analysis
comes from differences across classes in patent extension, so the actual
magnitude of the extension is unimportant.
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Figure 6: Patent Extension
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A comparison between the processing time for the full data set
and the subset from after the law change indicates that PTO processing time is increasing. This should not present a major problem for
this analysis unless the increase in processing time is anticipated and
correlated with expected extension. That is a real possibility, however,
and its impact on this analysis is discussed in Part V.
The researchers who assembled the NBER dataset have created a
cruder categorization of patents than of classes, which are determined
60
by the PTO and number close to one thousand. These categories are
used as controls for some of the analyses, as well as to look at broad
subsets of the data. In Table 2, summary statistics are presented by
60

See Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, supra note 55, at 41-42 app. 1 (listing the categorizations of patent classes).
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category on term extension, citations, and simple counts. One point
that is apparent from the table is that there is substantial variation in
the impact of TRIPS even across very broad technological categories
(as measured by term extension). There is also substantial heterogeneity in citations by category, with computer and communication patents receiving the most on average. Finally, the categories—and the
patent classes—differ in the total number of patents and their growth
rate over the period examined. To account for this, some of the specifications described in the next section include class-specific time trends.
This should isolate the changes in innovation that are due to the heterogeneous influence of TRIPS on patent-term extensions.
III. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
The specifications used to empirically evaluate the impact of the
TRIPS law change follow from the theoretical framework discussed supra
Section I.C. The first approach uses patent count as a proxy for innovation. An increase in duration of patent protection should lead to an increase in the number of patents following implementation of the TRIPS
agreement. Further, the increase in patents should be greatest in those
classes that receive the longest extensions. To test this, I make use of a
difference-in-difference framework. The first difference is time: that before and that after the June 8, 1995, change of patent term (as indicated
below by the Afterm dummy variable). The second difference is crosssectional and makes use of the variation across patent classes with regard
to the expected effect of the law change on patent duration. Innovators
with patents in classes with long processing times can expect a short extension or even a decreased length of protection in extreme cases.
Those with patents in classes with rapid PTO processing times should
expect a substantial extension because of the law change.
A question then arises: how do innovators form expectations about
patent duration after the law change? The answer must be a function of
PTO processing time, patent class, and perhaps other idiosyncratic effects. In this Article, I make the simplifying assumption that the expected patent duration is solely a function of recent PTO processing
times within a given patent class. Thus, I am able to calculate the expected patent extension (or reduction) due to the law change.
Even making this assumption, there are numerous ways to calculate the expected extension. To gain some insight into the problem, it
is instructive to understand the stability of PTO processing times. Figure 7 presents processing time by technological category averaged
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61

over the previous two years. The figure indicates that, for most categories, there is little change in the mean PTO processing time, with
the possible exception of the Drugs and Medical category. This category experienced the most rapid increase in processing time of any
category over the full period examined, and it occurred in the two
years prior to the implementation of TRIPS. Even this rapid increase
amounted to about one hundred days over two years. Nevertheless,
the categories keep their relative ordering over this period. To calculate the expected extension, I first calculate the mean processing time
(averaged over a lagged two-year period) for each patent class. The
62
value of this variable on December 8, 1994, is used for all classes.
This is then subtracted from the three-year change in patent protection to obtain the variable Extensionc. The distribution of this variable
can be found in Figure 6.
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Figure 7: Processing Time by Technological Category
Averaged over the Previous Two Years
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That is, each point is the average of the PTO processing time for all subsequently granted patents applied for within the previous two years.
62
This date is used because it is the earliest time in which inventors could have
reasonably responded to the forthcoming change in the law and thus the earliest that
they could have formed their expectations.
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For the count regressions, I estimate the following base specification on monthly patent counts by patent class, which I will refer to as
Specification (1):
Pmc = Į + B1 Afterm + B2 Extensionc + B3 Afterm * Extensionc + B4 t + Xmc + Emc .
Here m denotes month and c denotes patent class. Pmc is the patent
count and Afterm is a dummy variable that is zero before June 8, 1995,
and one otherwise. Extensionc is the expected extension by class, t controls for a linear time trend, and Xmc is a set of time-varying controls
(not included in the base specification). These controls include the
63
type of entity to which the patent was assigned, generality of patent,
number of claims made, patent subcategory, and a quadratic function
of time that can vary by pre-post period.
There may be a concern that there are differences across patent
classes in their rates of growth of patenting. To address this concern, I
run a specification of the following form, deemed Specification (2),
which allows for class-specific time trends:
Pmc = Į + B1 Afterm + B2 Extensionc + B3 Afterm * Extensionc + BcClassct + Xmc + Emc .
The regressions are run on variable windows of data, with both an
inner and outer window. The inner window is used to exclude data right
around the change, which is likely to be impacted by the short-term effects discussed above. The outer window is varied in order to allow for
tradeoffs between greater data and greater potential contamination from
long-run secular trends (which may vary by patent class).
The second major approach to analyzing the impact of TRIPS on
innovation uses patent citations, rather than simple counts, as an indicator of value. Citation data poses a challenge not present with simple-count data, because, while each granted patent has a weight of one
at any time, citations are monotonically increasing over time. In Part
II, I discussed the approach that I have taken to computing a normalized citation count.
Once the renormalized citations are computed, I take two different approaches to analyzing the impact of TRIPS using citations as an
indicator of patent value. The first approach is analogous to Specifi-

63

See Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, supra note 55, at 21-23 (suggesting the generality
of a patent as an indicator of its widespread impact in the field).
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cations (1) and (2), run at the month-class level, where citations replace patent count as the dependent variable. These specifications
lose the patent-level variation, so I also analyze the impact of the law
change on citations using patent-level data in Specification (3) below:
Citeic = Į + B1 Afteri + B2 Extensionc + B3 Afteri * Extensionc + B4t + Xic + Emc .
Although the relationship between citations and extension is likely
to be somewhat nonlinear, I use a linear model here because it is
likely to be a good approximation over the time period examined.
The final specification combines information from citations with the
count data. I run regressions using counts as the dependent variable
(as in (1) and (2)) but weighted by citations. I discuss the results of
the estimations of these regressions below.
IV. RESULTS
The main findings from the regression analysis show that there
was a statistically significant change in the number of patents applied
for following the TRIPS agreement, but no significant difference in
mean citations per patent. Additionally, when examining citationweighted patent counts, the impact of TRIPS is found to be signifi64
cant. These results are reported in Table 4 (located in the Appendix) and Figures 8 through 10 below.
Table 4 contains results from three types of regressions: those
with patent counts as the dependent variable, patent counts weighted
by citations, and citations. The first two columns in Table 4 present
results from the most basic specifications, leaving out almost all controls. In the first column (as with the next five), the dependent variable is monthly patent counts, by patent class. This regression is run
on a dataset with a six month outer window and two month inner
window. The coefficient of interest (on the After * Extension interaction term) is significantly different from zero (p < 0.01). This indicates that patent classes with longer extensions due to TRIPS tended
to have a greater increase in patents following TRIPS than those
classes with shorter extensions. The second column reports results
from the same regression run with a twelve-month outer window and

64

Here and elsewhere I may use causal language about “the impact of the TRIPS
agreement.” This language is used for simplicity, since the changes are not necessarily
due to TRIPS. This is discussed further infra Part V.
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two-month inner window. The findings are substantially the same, although the coefficient of interest is somewhat smaller in this specification (but still significantly different from zero).
The coefficient on After in all of the regressions with patent count
as the dependent variable is negative and significantly different from
zero at p < 0.01. At first blush, this negative coefficient may be counterintuitive. But as might be expected from the option-like nature of
the law change, there was a spike in applications just prior to the implementation of the law, followed by a subsequent dip, as shown in
Figure 3. This is what leads to the negative coefficient on After; it is
precisely this window upon which the analysis is focused. The magnitude of the extension also has a negative relationship with patent
counts. In some specifications it is statistically significant, and in others it is not. The interpretation here must be that patent classes that
receive longer extensions tend to have lower patent counts.
Column three of Table 4 adds a larger set of controls, as compared to columns one and two. The controls include measures of the
citing patents, including the mean year of the citing patents and the
mean number of cites to the citing patents (a measure of their importance). There are two controls that make use of a measure of patent
generality: one of the citing patents and one of the patents in ques65
tion. Two additional controls are included: the number of claims
made on the patent and the number of “parents.” The control vari2
ables increase the R of the regression from 0.16 to 0.46 for the twelvemonth outer window. The finding from this specification is the same
as the first two: there is a statistically significant coefficient on the difference-in-difference interaction term.
Columns four and five present regressions of the form described
above by Specification (2). The main difference with the previously described regressions is the addition of class-specific time trends. These
trends account for the possibility that classes have varying trends in patenting that are unconnected to the TRIPS agreement. The differencein-difference coefficients estimated in these specifications are somewhat
larger than those estimated in the base specification. These coefficient
estimates (along with one for a twenty-four month outer window) are
presented visually in Figure 8. The point estimates and standard errors
are plotted and are relatively consistent.

65

See Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, supra note 55, at 21 (suggesting that a high generality score indicates widespread impact of the patent).
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Figure 8: Coefficient Estimates
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Specification (3) above describes the regressions examining the
impact of the TRIPS agreement, not on patent counts, but on citations
per patent. As discussed above, this is likely a better measure of the
66
main quantity of interest—innovative output. Columns seven and
eight in Table 4 and Figure 9 present results from the estimation of
Specification (3). Unlike the regressions discussed previously, column
seven presents results from analysis of patent-level data. For the sixmonth outer window (and all other windows not reported), the coefficient on the After * Extension interaction term is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is also the case when the data are analyzed
at the class-month level, as in column eight. Figure 6 displays the coefficient and the standard error from this regression, along with three
others with varying outer windows. All point estimates are insignificantly different from zero, with standard errors for most around
0.0001. In Part V, I return to these findings and discuss the implication of the zero coefficients.

66

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Figure 9: Results from the Estimation of Specification (3)
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The final approach that I take to valuing innovation using patents
employs citation-weighted patent counts. This approach is similar to
those described in columns one through five of Table 4. The dependent variable is still patent count, but now each patent is weighted
by the number of citations it had received as of December 31, 2002
(normalized according to the procedure described supra Part II).
This is the preferred specification because it should get closest to the
object of interest here: a measure of the value of innovation.
The results from the citation-weighted regressions are presented
in column six of Table 4 and in Figure 10. When we examine relatively smaller windows, as in Table 4 or the first two observations in the
figures, we find a statistically significant coefficient on the interaction
term of around 0.06. The figure indicates that the size of the window
is important, because the coefficient loses statistical significance as the
outer window increases beyond half a year. This mixed finding is discussed further in Part V.
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Figure 10: Results from Citation-Weighted Regressions
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V. DISCUSSION
In order to gain a better understanding of the regression results, it
is useful to perform some back-of-the-envelope calculations in order to
understand the magnitude of the law changes’ impact. The preferred
specification is the citation-weighted regression, shown in column six
of Table 4. The coefficient on the interaction term is 0.063, meaning
that a one-day-greater extension for a patent category is associated
with a 0.063 more patents (citation weighted) after the implementation of TRIPS. Although Trajtenberg found somewhat increasing returns to citations, to be conservative I will assume a linear relationship be67
tween value of innovation and citation-weighted counts.
Let us consider the increase in value of innovation due to a one–
standard-deviation increase in patent-term extension. The standard
deviation of the term extension (by class) is 114 days (see Figure 6 for
the full distribution). Multiplying this by the coefficient above, we

67

Trajtenberg, supra note 9, at 182-83.
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find that a one-standard-deviation increase in patent term extension is
associated with an increase of about seven monthly patents. From a
mean of approximately thirty-four, in percentage terms, this comes to
a twenty-one percent increase in value of innovation—a very substantial increase. It seems unlikely that the deadweight loss due to exclusive rights would be enough to offset this considerable gain, suggesting that an increase in patent terms could lead to greater welfare.
There are several impediments to drawing clear policy implications from this exercise. These include concerns about outliers, unobserved variation, misspecification, and external validity. The magnitude of the estimated effect seems inordinately high, given that the
extensions are relative to base protections of seventeen years, and,
thus, the total extension is only on the order of seven percent (which
would imply an elasticity of around three).
One potential explanation for the large point estimates is that the
results are driven by a few highly affected classes. Preliminary analysis
indicates that it is likely that biological patents are responsible for the
bulk of the observed impact of TRIPS. This finding is strengthened by
the fact that the pharmaceutical industry was one of the industries
most ardently opposed to TRIPS due to concern over shortened patent duration. A more detailed analysis of the impact of TRIPS on
pharmaceutical patents is beyond the scope of this Article, but is the
subject of future research.
Unobserved variables are another potential roadblock to drawing
a causal inference of the impact of patent-term extension. I attempt
to control for as many patent characteristics as possible, but there is
still a relatively large amount of unexplained variation. Of particular
concern is if there is a variable that is correlated with both term extension and patent counts because the law change came with six month’s
advance notice. One mechanism by which this might occur is if innovators in patent classes with short expected extensions rushed to patent under the old law, thus creating a spike in those applications prior
to the change. Then those classes would show an artificially low number of applications immediately after the law change, as many that
would have been filed at that time had already been filed. This is exactly the pattern we see in Figure 3. Of course, this is the rationale
behind excluding an inner window around the law change. But if the
inner window is not long enough, the estimate will be biased upward.
Another potential problem with the interpretation of the findings
is the possibility that innovators will form expectations about the patent-term extension differently from that assumed. In order to test the
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explanatory power of the lagged processing-time variable, I regressed
actual term extension on the computed extension. I found that the
computed extension increases explanatory power by eight percent
2
relative to a regression on the other control variables (R increased
from 0.114 to 0.195). If the deviations between innovators’ beliefs
about the extensions and the calculated extensions used in the analysis are correlated, then the estimates provided will overstate the magnitude of the impact in equilibrium, where we assume that people
have rational expectations. Alternatively, people may have rational
expectations even in the transition, and PTO processing times may be
changing in a way that is correlated with prior processing times (i.e.,
classes with longer initial processing times also have a greater increase
in processing time than those with shorter initial processing times).
There are two final concerns about how well this exercise meets
the aim of shedding light on the relationship between patent duration
and the value of innovation. The first concern is whether the data
used are on granted patent applications. Ideally, one would prefer data
on all applications. If the grant rate changed differentially by magnitude of extension around the time of the TRIPS agreement, this could
lead to a spurious result. A second concern is how well patent
counts—or even citation-weighted counts—actually correspond to
value of innovation. Much of the literature making use of citationweighted counts is based on a small number of studies that try to obtain external measures of patent value, generally on a small dataset.
To the extent that this relationship is not general, one cannot draw
any strong conclusions about value of innovation here.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the incentive effects of patent protection is a core
issue in intellectual property scholarship, about which almost nothing
is currently known. This Article seeks both to advance our knowledge
of the relationship between value of innovation and duration of patent protection and to point the way toward further research.
The TRIPS agreement was the biggest change in U.S. patent pro68
tection in over forty years. It altered not only the mean expected
length of patent protection but also the method by which it is calcu69
lated—from grant date to application date. This aspect of the law

68
69

See supra note 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
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had a heterogeneous impact across patent classes, depending on the
expected PTO processing time. I use this heterogeneity and compare
patent counts, citations, and citation-weighted counts before and after
the implementation of TRIPS.
My findings indicate that patent classes with longer extensions are
associated with a statistically significant increase—relative to patent
classes with shorter extensions—in patent counts and citationweighted counts after the law change. There does not, however, appear to be any statistically significant association with mean citations
per patent. Although this finding is striking, it must be understood in
light of several potential confounds that may otherwise cause it to be
overstated. While this study cannot conclusively determine the relationship between the duration of patent protection and the value of
innovation, the insights gained here point toward even more powerful
analyses for future research.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Before Law Change
Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Observations

Number of Claims

13.51

11.00

11.05

496,920

Forward Cites

6.40

4.00

9.85

509,672

1.00

0.56

1.51

509,672

PTO Processing Time
(years)

1.89

1.66

1.08

510,890

Term Extension (years)

1.11

1.34

1.08

510,890

(through 2002)
Forward Cites
(FE adjustment)

Panel B: After Law Change
Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Observations

Number of Claims

14.18

12.00

10.87

167,577

Forward Cites

1.81

1.00

3.65

605,481

1.00

0.29

1.93

605,481

PTO Processing Time (years)

2.32

2.06

1.15

660,330

Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Observations

Number of Claims

13.68

11.00

11.01

664,497

Forward Cites

3.91

2.00

7.54

1,115,153

1.00

0.47

1.75

1,115,153

2.14

1.88

1.14

1,171,220

(through 2002)
Forward Cites
(FE adjustment)

Panel C: All Data

(through 2002)
Forward Cites
(FE adjustment)
PTO Processing Time (years)

Note: Summary statistics for all patents granted from 1990 through 2000, in
classes that received at least thirty applications per year that were eventually
granted. Some claims data are missing in original NBER patent files, with no
claims data reported after 1998. 290 total patent classes were used.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Technological Category
Observations

Term Extension
(Years)

Forward
Citations

Before

After

Drugs and Medical

0.65

4.50

64,476

79,137

Computers and
Communication

0.83

5.53

49,715

87,177

Chemical

1.13

3.29

99,909

95,747

Electrical and
Electronic

1.17

4.29

87,751

111,541

Other

1.32

3.29

103,951

117,390

Mechanical

1.33

3.36

103,740

114,347

Note: Summary statistics by broad technological category (using the
NBER patent-classification system) for all patents granted from 1990
through 2000 in classes that received at least thirty applications per year
that were eventually granted. Term extension is calculated based on
mean PTO processing time in that category prior to the law change. “Before” and “After” are relative to date of patent-term change, June 8, 1995.
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Table 3: Patents with Fewer Than Thirty Applications in
at Least One Year Between 1990 and 2000
Current Title
Information-Processing-System
Organization

PTO
Class
395

Year
Year
Patents from
1990 to 2000 Established Abolished
26,831
1991
2000

Semiconductor-Device
Manufacturing: Process

438

18,654

1997

-

Electrical Computers and
Data Processes

364

12,392

1977

1999

Incremental Printing of
Symbolic Information

347

8236

1994

-

Electrical Computers and
Digital-Processing Systems:
Multicomputer Data
Transferring

709

7735

1999

-

Semiconductor Device
Manufacturing: Process

437

7322

1987

1997

Data Processing: Database and
File Management or
Data Structures

707

7214

1997

-

Miscellaneous Active Electrical
Nonlinear Devices, Circuits,
and Systems

327

7121

1994

-

Electrical Computers and
Digital-Processing Systems:
Memory

711

5083

1997

-

Electrophotography

399

4921

1996

-

Error Detection/Correction
and Fault Detection/Recovery

714

4490

1999

-

Electrical Computers and
Digital-Processing Systems:
Support

713

4149

1999

-

Data Processing: Financial,
Business Practice, Management,
or Cost/Price Determination

705

4090

1997

-

Electrical Computers and
Digital Data-Processing Systems:
Input/Output

710

4088

1999

-

1646
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Year
Year
Patents from
1990 to 2000 Established Abolished
4061
1996
-

Abrading

451

3965

1994

-

Games Using Tangible Projectile

473

3916

1993

-

Liquid-Crystal Cells, Elements
and Systems

349

3619

1996

-

Data Processing: Vehicles,
Navigation, and Relative
Location

701

3559

1997

-

Data Processing: Speech-Signal
Processing, Linguistics, Language
Translation, and Audio
Compression/Decompression

704

3332

1997

-

Cleaning Compositions for Solid
Surfaces, Auxiliary
Compositions, or Processes of
Preparing the Compositions

510

3079

1996

-

Electronic Digital-Logic Circuitry

326

3000

1994

-

Data Processing: Measuring,
Calibrating, or Testing

702

2869

1998

-

Error Detection/Correction and
Fault Detection/Recovery

371

2802

1980

1999

Photography

354

2536

1973

1996

Television-Signal Processing for
Dynamic Recording or
Reproducing

386

2509

1996

-

Data Processing: Generic
Control Systems or Specific
Applications

700

2358

1999

-

Electrical Computers and
Digital-Processing Systems:
Processing Architectures and
Instruction Processing

712

1987

1999

-

Etching a Substrate: Processes

216

1630

1995

-

Note: This table presents a partial list of patent classes dropped due to having insufficient observations in a given year. All of the most populous
dropped classes were either created or discontinued in the 1990s.

Did TRIPS Spur Innovation?

2009]

1647

Table 4: Impact of TRIPS on Patent Counts
Dependent
Variable
After

Extension (days)

(1)

(2)

-41.8

-32.2

(13.3)**

(9.9)**

-0.18

-0.15

Patent Count
(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

-37.1

-58.2

-31.8

-41.0

(10.2)** (18.7)* (18.0)** (11.5)**
-0.037

-0.033

-0.048

-0.069

Citations
(7)
(8)
0.027

0.063

(0.105)

(0.081)

0.00032

0.00014

(0.048)** (0.041)** (0.021) (0.024) (0.021)* (0.027)* (.00025) (0.00016)
After*Extension

0.085

0.049

0.039

0.082

0.108

0.063

-1.76E-05 -9.36E-05

(0.029)** (0.020)* (0.019)* (.039)* (0.038)** (0.025)** (.00013) (0.00012)
Time (months)

Generality of
Citing Patents

Mean Year of
Citing Patents
Mean Cites to
Citing Patents

-1.21

0.89

5.77

-1.11

1.33

-1.04

0.012

0.0056

(0.37)**

(0.14)

(1.39)**

(0.75)

(0.28)**

(0.76)

(.021)

(0.016)

-

-

-17.2

-4.79

-1.54

-24.43

-0.092

-0.65

-

-

(8.71)*

(3.61)

(1.56)

(15.2)

(.082)

(0.16)**

-

-

4.93
(1.87)**

0.40
(0.71)

-0.43
(0.42)

7.08
0.34
0.12
(2.71)** (.027)** (0.026)**

-

-

10.01
(3.40)**

0.78
(0.91)

0.03
(0.38)

14.52
0.44
0.45
(4.46)** (.032)** (0.044)**

Claims
-

-

0.22

0.02

-0.003

0.01

-

-

(0.20)

(.10)

(0.044)

(0.34)

-

-

-1.37
(5.74)

-1.87
(1.85)

-1.39
(0.88)

-10.69
(8.17)

0.052
(.025)*

0.58
(0.065)**

-

-

9.01
(3.76)**

-2.11
(1.76)

0.46
(1.10)

10.56
(5.14)*

0.041
(.017)*

0.08
(0.036)*

ClassMonth
no

ClassMonth
no

ClassMonth
no

ClassMonth
yes

ClassMonth
yes

ClassMonth
no

Patent
no

ClassMonth
no

no

no

no

no

no

yes

no

no

Outside Window

6

12

12

6

12

6

6

6

Inside Window

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Observations

1155

2882

2856

1148

2856

1148

21050

1148

R2

0.17

0.16

0.46

0.98

0.95

0.50

0.19

0.59

Generality
Index
Number of
Patents
Observation
Level
Class-Specific
Time Trend
CitationWeighted

0.016

0.02

(.0021)** (0.0032)**

Note: All data from PTO spanning different windows around June 8, 1995, as indicated (windows in months). Citations are total received per patent as of December 31, 2002. Extension is the expected increase in patents due to TRIPS, calculated by patent class. All standard errors are clustered by patent class.
Dummies for technology subcategory are included in all regressions. “*” indicates
significance at p < 0.05 and “**” indicates significance at p < 0.01.

